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Summary 
Living in the neighborhood of Asia’s giants has always been a challenge for western-
oriented Australia. The rise of China, however, which is not only likely to lead to 
tremendous power shifts between the U.S. and China but most probably will also lead to a 
full-fledged power transition, is a formidable challenge for Australia. On the positive side, 
Beijing has become Australia’s number one trading partner over the last few years, when 
it comes to both exports as well as imports. Thanks to China’s ever growing demand for 
Australia’s raw materials and resources, Australia got off lightly during the economic 
crisis which hit many Western countries severely in 2008 and 2009. On the negative side, 
however, China’s economic rise is mirrored by a significant increase in the country’s 
military might. Beijing is investing heavily in military capabilities and has changed 
spending priorities from land-based forces to the air force and navy, a clear indication of 
power-projection ambitions. Many foreign policy experts – not only Australian ones – 
share the strong feeling that a naval clash between China and America in the South-East 
Pacific is the most likely scenario involving open military conflict between the two 
powers. At least, and here even more agree, the pronounced Chinese armament program 
will severely limit America’s freedom of movement in Pacific waters. From an Australian 
perspective, this might mean that in the not too distant future America could be unable to 
project enough power into the region to defend her ally Australia against potential harm, 
or that Australia might become involved in a conflict the Australian Defence Forces are 
not keen to be part of. 
When Kevin Rudd won the Australian national elections in 2007, however, many 
observers expected a rather soft course on China. Rudd, being fluent in Mandarin and 
having spent some years in Beijing, was seen as a China lover with a heightened interest in 
harmonious relations with mainland China. However, Rudd surprised the Australian 
public with two seemingly inconsistent policies towards China: On the one hand he 
proposed what he called an “Asia Pacific Community” (APC), where he tried to integrate 
China – as well as the U.S. – into a more formal regional institution, while naming 
China’s military programs a potential cause of concern for its neighbors in the 2009 
Defence White Book and advocating a huge military procurement program.  
Both initiatives aroused rather controversial reactions individually and were hardly seen 
as a monolithic policy. This report examines the concept of so-called “Power Transition 
Theory” to show that the APC proposal and the Defence White Paper do not contradict but 
complement each other. The lack of a keen feel for presentation, diplomatic tone and – to 
some extent at least – political feasibility cast a shadow over Rudd’s approach to China.  
It is interesting to see, however, that a self-proclaimed “middle power” like Australia is 
not being paralyzed by the tremendous changes taking place but is instead trying to 
influence significantly “bigger” players in its own interest. 
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1. Introduction 
When Hugh White, Professor of International Relations at the Australian National 
University, former advisor to Prime Minister Hawke and former deputy secretary of the 
Defence Department, published his paper “Power Shift – Australia’s Future between 
Washington and Beijing” in the fall of 2010 (White 2010), he may have foreseen criticism 
and rejection. The designation of his paper, however, as the “single, stupidest strategic 
document ever prepared in Australian history by someone who once held a position of 
some responsibility in our system” (Sheridan 2010) by the foreign editor of The 
Australian newspaper, Greg Sheridan, may have been more than White expected. In his 
paper, White was so bold as to argue that to avoid a major war in the Pacific between the 
U.S. and China, America had to be persuaded to give up her primacy in the region and 
engage in a cooperative concert of power with China – and that Australia should exert all 
her influence on the U.S. to do so.  
Despite the irritating and slightly misplaced tone of Sheridan’s reaction, his harsh 
criticism, as well as a controversial debate on the renowned Lowy Institute’s Interpreter 
blog1 show that White hit a nerve. For some time now Australian scholars as well as the 
political class have been struggling with the strategic implications of China’s obvious 
economic rise and its implications for the Western Pacific region in general and Australia 
in particular. More than many other Western countries, Australia is directly affected by 
China’s impressive economic success – for better or worse.  
But how should such a relatively small country (when it comes to population and 
overall GDP) as Australia deal with the rise of a giant like China? Unfortunately, most of 
the international relations literature does not give a straight answer, as it focuses on 
bilateral relations between the “dominant power USA and her contender China. Theories 
of international relations dealing with power struggle and strategic issues usually do not 
address states below the great powers. Are “middle powers” – a common self-reference to 
their country by Australian foreign policy experts – like Australia therefore forced to 
stand on the sidelines while the great powers decide their fate as well? Or to paraphrase 
Thucydides’s famous words: do the weak really have to suffer what they must, while the 
strong do what they can?  
Is seems clear that the scope of action for smaller powers during major power shifts or 
even a power transition is rather limited; however, there are viable options for influencing 
the politics exercised by major powers. While this report does not dare formulate well 
meant recommendations, it will debate Australia’s approach to China under former 
Prime Minister (and now Foreign Minister) Kevin Rudd. Most observers had expected 
 
 
1  www.lowyinterpreter.org/ (25.2.2011). European scholars might be puzzled by the relevance given to an 
online-debate here. However, not only is “The Interpreter” one of the most renowned blogs in Asia, but 
the list of participants basically represents the “who’s who” of Australian foreign policy academia. 
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Rudd, a scholar of Asian Studies, fluent in Mandarin (being the only Western head of 
government with this ability) and with several years of diplomatic experience gathered at 
the Australian embassy in Beijing, to be soft on China. However, he surprised spectators 
with a policy towards China which – at least at first glance – seemed to be inconsistent. 
On the one hand, Rudd made a proposal to integrate China and the United States into 
what he called an “Asian Pacific Community” (APC). On the other hand the Defence 
White Book of 2009 named China’s rise a potential cause for concern and – at least 
indirectly – a possible threat to Asia’s and Australia’s security. It is interesting to note that 
most scholars judged each policy by its own merits only, and did not connect the two. 
This is astonishing as these policies do not necessarily conflict. On the contrary: from the 
perspective of what scholars of international relations call Power Transition Theory 
(PTT), this seeming contradiction can be understood as a coherent approach.  
To fully understand the basic idea behind Rudd’s way of dealing with China this report 
will first sketch the economic rise of China vis-à-vis the U.S. and the theoretical 
implications of that rise as seen from PTT. In the following second section, I will argue 
that it is more likely than it has ever been over the last hundred years that the power 
structure between the most important nations will not only shift but that there will be a 
full power transition, with China overtaking the economic might of the United States 
within the next ten to 15 years. The third section of this report deals with the implications 
of China’s economic as well as military rise for Australia and the Australian alliance with 
the United States. Against this background, the fourth section will present the two most 
important and controversial policies initiated under Rudd, the APC and the 2009 Defence 
White Paper, which will be evaluated against the background described in sections two 
and three. The final section offers a more general conclusion and evaluates Rudd’s 
approach in comparison to the approach presented by Hugh White.2 
Before continuing, however, a disclaimer should be made: The focus of this report is 
neither China nor Chinese-American relations but a middle power’s reaction to potential 
scenarios connected to the rise of China – which in this case is Australia, but might be 
another country as well. Many allegations and scenarios described in this context might 
be rejected by Chinese scholars or politicians as misrepresentation or even fantasy. But as 
the focus lies on Australia’s perception, this report does not question the validity of these 
perceptions, as long as they are understood to be the underlying reason for a particular 
Australia behavior. 
 
 
2  Given the focus of this report, White’s proposal cannot be debated in detail, and it is more likely than not 
that my rough sketches will do White’s paper more wrong than right. 
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2.  The rise of China: Empirical and theoretical perspectives 
2.1  Passing the eagle by? China’s growth trajectory 
“A Chinese challenge to American power in Asia is no longer a future possibility but a 
current reality” (White 2010: 2). Not only among academics but among policymakers as 
well, there is a strong expectation that the economic rise of China will eventually lead to a 
power shift in the international system, with the United States losing power (at least 
relatively) vis-à-vis China. According to the World Bank, China’s growth rates have 
exceeded those of the U.S. and all other Western countries for more than a decade (see 
figure 1). Even during the World Financial Crisis in 2008 and 2009, China’s economy 
grew by almost 10%.  
 
Figure 1: GDP growth since 2000 (Source: World Bank)3 
Based on this data, many experts expect China to become the economically most powerful 
nation in the near future, leading not only to a shift in relative power but to a full-fledged 
power transition. In 2003, a study by Goldman and Sachs forecast that the Chinese GDP 
would surpass the U.S.’s around 2040 (Wilson/Purushothaman 2003), but given more 
recent data, it is reasonable to expect that point in time sooner rather than later. Simple 
 
 
3  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (18.12.2010). 
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linear expectations based on the 2009 nominal GDP and the average growth rate during 
the 2000 to 2009 period lead one, as suggested by Figure 2, to expect China to surpass the 
U.S. as early as late 2022.  
 
Figure 2: Linear expectation of GDP growth China/U.S. based on 2009 GDP (in 2009 prices) and 
average 2000-2009 growth rate (my calculations)4 
The Economist's Free Exchange blog even offers a more sophisticated yet interactive 
model to predict the power transition.
5
 Within the range of reasonable assumptions, 
China will overtake the United States in eight to 12 years. So even in the unlikely event of 
a sharp drop in China’s growth and an accelerating economy in the United States, the gap 
in economic performance seems too large to offer the U.S. a realistic chance of keeping 
her position as the economically most powerful state for more than a few decades. 
Many scholars have focused on this likely power transition, and the numbers of essays 
on the future of U.S.–Chinese relations are legion. But what does this rise of China mean 
for the South East Asian region in general and Australia in particular? At first glance, 
China’s powerful economy has acted as a shield for many Asian countries, protecting 
them from the economic slump European states and the U.S. had to face. Even more, an 
economically powerful China can act as a driving force during worldwide recession. To 
understand the worries and fears associated with the rise of China, Power Transition 
Theory offers an answer.  
 
 
4  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (18.1.2011). 
5  www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/01/china (18.1.2011). 
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2.2  The theoretical perspective: Power Transition Theory and potential for 
conflict 
Power Transition Theory (PTT) is closely tied to the work of A.F.K. Organski who had 
developed the basic ideas of PTT in the late 1950s, at a time when the mainstream of 
scholars of international relations believed in the beneficial and pacifying effects of a 
balance of power (BoP). While PTT shares some assumptions with Neorealism, i.e. 
sovereign nation states as the most important actors in the international realm 
(DiCicco/Levy 1999: 679) and a similar pessimistic picture about world politics, it differs 
significantly in its major conclusion: In stark contrast to classical BoP theory, Organski 
argues that equal power has by no means prevented states from going to war against each 
other, but rather the other way around (Tammen 2008: 315). According to PTT, “peace is 
preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged 
and advantaged nations” (Organski/Kugler 1980: 19). From this perspective, 
preponderance is a guarantee of peace and not a stimulus for rivalry, balancing and 
uncertainty. From a theoretical point of view, the main difference is that Neorealism 
focuses solely on relative power and hard power alone (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), 
while PTT takes into account soft factors like the normative order of the international 
system as well. According to PTT, the most powerful, the “dominant” state in the 
international system imposes a certain set of rules and norms on the less powerful states 
to “run” the international system not only by force but via a normative order in a – more 
or less – cooperative manner (Tammen et al. 2000: 7f). Ruling through force alone is 
generally understood to be the most expensive form of rule, the dominant state tries to 
share responsibilities and “’buys in’ nations to a common set of international norms 
through which [it] directly and indirectly influences events” (Tammen 2008: 318). But 
while the normative order takes into account the interests of smaller states, it is of course 
designed in such a way as to be most beneficial to the dominant state. Consequently, not 
all states benefit from the dominant order in the same way, leaving most of the smaller 
states and some of the great powers dissatisfied with the status quo, while other powers’ 
needs are satisfied to a level of satisfaction (Tammen 2008: 319).  
According to PTT, the time of a dominant state at the top of the international 
hierarchy is limited, as mature economies tend to experience declining growth or 
diminishing returns over time. States with a different growth trajectory, especially states 
with a bigger population but less efficient means of production, therefore have the chance 
of surpassing the economic might of the dominant state over time as their methods of 
production evolve. Consequently, the dominant power has to monitor the major powers 
for the “emergence of peer competitors” (Tammen 2008: 320) which will eventually 
surpass its power.  
According to Organski, these power transitions are very likely to lead to war between 
the contender and the dominant state. However, the likelihood of war is mitigated by the 
“satisfaction” of the challenger with the current international system. If the contender 
feels that its needs are addressed within the normative order established by its rival, or 
even that it owes its own success to this particular order, there is no need to change it by 
bellicose means. One might think about the case of the United States’s rise, overtaking the 
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then dominant Britain, to appreciate that peaceful power transitions are indeed possible 
(Organski/Kugler 1980: 44). On the other hand, should the rising great power feel that the 
current order conflicts with its needs and interests, a war to establish a new order seems 
inevitable.  
Interestingly enough, conventional PTT argues that it is not the dominant power that 
is most likely to start the war to defend its preferred order, but rather the contender. In 
addition, PTT assumes that the probability of war significantly rises once the contender 
reaches at least 80 per cent of the dominant power’s power, as 80 plus per cent can 
roughly be understood as equality.
6
 So, while both the minimum power necessary for the 
emerging contender to actually challenge the dominant state as well as dissatisfaction with 
the current system or international order can be understood as necessary conditions for a 
violent power transition, both are insufficient on their own. Only if both criteria are met 
is war between the two most important states likely. 
To mitigate the likelihood of a major war between the most powerful states in the 
international realm, PTT recommends that “the dominant power should first attempt to 
manage the policy preferences of potential challengers so that in the event of a relative 
decline in power resulting in power parity, the probability of conflict will be reduced. […] 
it is critically important to do so under the circumstances of a challenger approaching 
parity with a dominant country” (Tammen 2008: 320f). But how can the preferences of 
the rising state be managed? “The dominant power can attempt to wrap a web of 
international obligations, relationships, and common understandings around the 
emerging challenger […] ‘socializing’ a challenger into an international system with rules 
and norms acceptable to the dominant nation” (Tammen 2008: 321).
7
  
These recommendations prove that PTT differs profoundly from neorealism and its 
narrowed focus on material factors, and takes into account factors usually associated with 
the constructivist camp (Legro/Moravcsik 1999). But what seems to be a great theoretical 
strength bears severe empirical problems. How can a dissatisfied, or revisionist state be 
identified before it reveals itself in a great war? This issue has not been solved 
satisfactorily by PTT scholars, and the issue of satisfaction, “the central variable of PTT on 
which the willingness of the rising power to wage a war rests […] is dramatically 
underdeveloped in theory as well as in practice” (Rauch/Wurm 2010: 8).  
 
 
6  The obvious question in this context is how PTT measures power. According to Organski and Kugler 
"[t]hree extremely large and complex factors are primarily involved: (1) the number of people in a nation 
who can work and fight, (2) the skills and productivity of the active population, and (3) the capacity of the 
governmental system to mobilize the human and material resources at its disposal and devote them to 
national goals" (Organski/Kugler 1980: 8). 
7  In this regard Rauch and Wurm (2010) explore the concept of a liberal hegemony in order to manage a 
future power transition peacefully. Müller and Rauch (2011) discuss ignorance, resistance and acceptance 
as possible reaction patterns of declining hegemons facing the rise of new powers. 
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Finally, it is interesting to note that Organski had already referred to China and India 
as potential challengers to U.S. supremacy when he first published his ideas in the late 
1950s, “a prediction or prophecy so unreasonable, so absurd in its time,” given how 
security studies fixated on the USSR, “that virtually no one paid attention to it” (Tammen 
2008: 314). Today, as described above, for many the idea of China overtaking the United 
States seems not a question of “if” but rather of “when?” So with one of the conditions 
fulfilled, the focus shifts to the second condition, satisfaction. No wonder that Power 
Transition Theory has gained tremendously in importance during the last decade or so. 
3.  Turmoil ahead? The impact of China’s rise on Australia  
When it comes to the rise of China, Australian citizens are torn between two extremes: on 
the one hand, Australians welcome growing trade with China, and Australia has profited 
tremendously from the booming Chinese economy in recent troubling times. On the 
other hand, the rise of China causes angst and many people are concerned about 
geopolitical changes in general and regional implications in particular. According to the 
Lowy Institute’s 2010 poll “Australia and the World” almost half of the population, 46%, 
think that it is “somewhat likely” or “very likely” “that China will become a military threat 
to Australia in the next 20 years” (Hanson 2010: 11). In an analysis of the poll, tellingly 
entitled “Sweet and Sour,” Andrew Shearer concludes that “China’s rise is the most 
significant external event affecting Australia for several decades. How it plays out will 
shape our national choices and profoundly influence not only our future prosperity but 
also our long-term security” (Shearer 2010: 3). 
But why do Australians come to this ambivalent conclusion? To understand these two 
perspectives, one has to look both at the economic relevance of China for the Australian 
economy as well as Australia’s current security architecture.   
3.1  The economic side: Keeping the Australian economy afloat 
Compared with other Western economies, Australia has been a booming country for 
almost two decades now. Between 1992 and 2010 – including the years of the Asian crisis 
in the late 1990s as well as the great financial crisis in recent years, the average growth rate 
has been slightly above three per cent p.a., usually one per cent above the OECD’s 
average.8 Rich in natural resources, Australian exports are dominated by coal, iron and 
copper ore, petroleum and other minerals, while Australia hardly exports any 
manufactured goods. In 2006-7 “over 80 per cent” of the resource sector’s output was 
 
 
8  www.dfat.gov.au/aib/competitive_economy.html (22.12.2010). www.economist.com/node/8931798?story 
_id= 8931798 (22.12.2010).  
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exported, “accounting for approximately 49 per cent of total goods and services exports”.9 
The importance of the minerals and petroleum industries is highlighted by the fact that 
they generated approximately eight per cent of Australia’s GDP in 2006-7 alone. 
Due to this particular export structure, Australia is profiting strongly from China’s 
economic boom, probably more than almost all other Western states. With its rising 
demand for energy, resources and raw materials, China’s relevance as Australia’s trading 
partner grew steeply in importance over the last 15 years: Between 1998 and 2004 trade 
between Australia and China doubled (de Silva 2007: 50). In 2005, China became 
Australia’s second largest trade partner (Wesley 2007), and in 2008 the largest. In 2009-10 
China received 23.1% of Australia’s exports (with Japan second with 18.5%) while 17.9% 
of Australian imports originated in China (followed by imports from the United States 
with 11.8%).10  
Between 2004 and 2009 exports of minerals grew by “an average annual rate of almost 
47%,” while manufacturing exports only grew by “an average of 13.2 per cent annually.”11 
Iron ore and coal are by far the most important Australian exports to China. While all 
imports from Australia were only 4% of China’s total imports, Australia supplied 40% of 
all iron ore imports to China (Larum 2010: 6). 
The chances are good that trade might increase even more in the future: First, despite 
raising interest rates to prevent an overheating of its economy, the Chinese economy is 
still expected to continue growing at an almost two-digit rate. In addition, since 2005 both 
countries have been engaged in negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which 
would foster two-way trade again (Larum 2010: 22). However, no final agreement has yet 
been achieved. 
These close ties to the booming Chinese economy protected Australia to a major 
degree from the perils of the global financial crisis, and “the Chinese economy [is] a key 
driver of Australia’s economic performance” (Larum 2010: 3). According to the 
Parliamentary Library Briefing Book, in 2009 trade with China rose against a broad trend:  
“Affected by the GFC, Australia’s total merchandise trade decreased by 11.6 per cent in 
2009, and experienced the first fall in exports since 1964–65. Exports fell by $27.4 billion or 
12.2 percent to $196.9 billion from their record peak in 2008 of $224.3 billion. Imports fell 
by $25.5 billion or 11.1 per cent to $203.2 billion. […] While trade between Australia and its 
major trading partners fell considerably, trade between Australia and China increased by 
15.6 per cent, reaching a record level of $78.1 billion.”12 
If Australia wants its remarkable economic success story to continue, there is no way 
around a continued close economic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China.  
 
 
9  www.dfat.gov.au/facts/resources_sector.html (22.12.2010).  
10  www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/aust.pdf (19.12.2010).  
11  www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/china_brief.html (19.12.2010). 
12  www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BriefingBook43p/australia-china-gfc.htm (21.12.2010).  
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In addition to sheer trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the other nation’s 
country has also grown over the last decade. However, while Australia ranked third in 
2008 as the destination for Chinese FDI (Larum 2010: 8), Australians are more reluctant 
to invest in China, “with China accounting for only 0.7% of Australia’s outward FDI 
stock” (Larum 2010: 9). Given Australia’s export structure to China, Australian firms do 
not profit much from relocating production to China. While Chinese FDI again acts as a 
stimulus to the Australian economy, its amount and structure has raised concerns about 
excessive Chinese influence in sectors of strategic importance (Cook/Thirlwell 2008), 
especially the mining sector. Early in 2008 Treasurer Wayne Swan reacted to the surge of 
Chinese investment with new guidelines for the foreign investment screening regime, 
with the aim of ensuring that foreign investment is consistent with Australia’s national 
interest.13 
In 2009 Chinese FDI in Australia were brought to the collective consciousness once 
again when Chinese-born Australian citizen Stern Hu, executive of the iron ore mining 
company Rio Tinto, was arrested in China (together with three Chinese employees) for 
alleged bribery. Only weeks before the arrest Rio Tinto had rejected an investment of 
almost US$ 20 billion by the Aluminum Corporation Of China (Chinalco), leading to 
allegations that the charges were retaliatory.14 According to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, “China is also a major foreign purchaser of Australian debt including 
government securities, although precise levels are not available.”15 
When it comes to public attitudes, polls reflect a divided perspective on China’s 
economic success. Already in 2008, i.e. before the Stern Hu incident, 78% of respondents 
were against or “strongly against” foreign investment by the Chinese government or 
government owned companies, with only 17% in favor (Hanson 2008: 6). On the other 
hand, 62% agreed or “strongly agreed” that China’s growth had been good for Australia. 
In 2010 even more, 73%, saw the positive sides of China’s growth for Australia, while 57% 
shared the opinion that the Australian government was allowing too much investment 
from China, and only 3% arguing for more Chinese investment (Hanson 2010: 9).  
So, obviously, the Australian public wants to reap the economic benefits of China’s 
rise, but is afraid of direct Chinese influence on the Australian economy. According to 
Andrew Shearer, these fears reflect “concerns about China’s authoritarian political system 
and possible strategic motives” (Shearer 2010: 1). To fully understand this angst, one has 
to look at the Australian perception of its strategic situation and its alliance structure, 
which goes back almost to the days of the founding of the federation. 
 
 
13  www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/009.htm&pageID=003&min= 
wms&Year=&DocType=0 (19.12.2010). 
14  www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1912420,00.html (20.12.2010).  
15  www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/BriefingBook43p/australia-china-gfc.htm (19.12.2010). 
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3.2  Living with Asian giants: Australia and the region 
3.2.1  “The odd man out”: British heritage  
When it comes to Australia’s place in the region and its relations with its neighbors, there 
seems to be an element of inexplicable fear (Burke 2008) present which is not necessarily 
apparent to a foreign observer at first sight. From the very early days of the settlement, 
Australians felt vastly outnumbered by the surrounding Asian masses. Today Australia’s 
population of 22,5 million is less than a tenth of its closest neighbor Indonesia, with a 
population of 232 million. In 2005 Coral Bell indicated that 10 out of 19 states which are 
projected to have a population of more than 100 million within the next decades are in 
“Australia’s area of strategic concern” (2005: 14). In a very realist tradition, the sheer 
numbers of their populations have always made other Asian countries potential threats in 
the eyes of the Australian public as well as the political elites (Burke 2008). Historically, 
the feeling of being outnumbered was paired with a latent xenophobic tendency inherited 
from British colonialism and a feeling of cultural superiority. These found their formal 
expression in the so-called “White Australia Policy” of intentionally restricted 
immigration of non-white people (abolished by the Labor government of Gough Whitlam 
as late as 1974), and more informal expression in the way the Australian government 
treated indigenous peoples, the Australian Aborigines.16 But Australian xenophobia did 
not fully end in the 1970s as the stunning results of Pauline Hanson’s “One Nation Party” 
in the late 1990s or the Howard government’s tough stance against illegal immigrants – 
especially during the Tampa affair – proved (Glasse 2001).17 Finally, Australians have 
always felt themselves to be an “isolated outpost and bastion of Western civilization” 
(Jones/Benvenuti 2006: 111). Given its British heritage, Australia understood – and to a 
certain degree still understands – herself to be “a bastion of liberal democratic values that 
it maintains and projects across the region” (Jones/Benvenuti 2006: 111). As the 
interventions in East Timor (1999) and the Solomon Islands (2003) have shown, 
Australians are deeply concerned with the human rights situation in their immediate 
neighborhood, and are willing to engage in what John Hutcheson has termed “wars of 
conscience” (2001). From the perspective of its Asian neighbors, however, the Australian 
advocacy of liberal values and human rights reflects “ignorance,” for some even 
“arrogance” (Wiryono 2006: 15). 
 
 
16  It took until 2008 for an Australian Prime Minister to apologize to the Aborigines for past wrongs, 
especially for the so-called Stolen Generation. 
17  Shortly before the 2001 election PM John Howard refused to let the Norwegian vessel Tampa – which had 
rescued Indonesian refugees from a sinking overloaded boat – enter the nearest Australian port, in order 
to demonstrate his tough stance on illegal immigration. The government claimed – against better 
knowledge – that asylum seekers on board had threatened to throw their children overboard in order to 
enforce passage to Australia, but that Australia would not let itself be blackmailed. The truth only came 
out after the election, when a Senate Select Committee inquired into the issue  and published a critical 
report (Australian Senate 2002) which, however, failed to have any impact on the next federal election. 
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In the 1980s and 1990s, the Hawke and Keating governments – and especially their 
foreign minister Gareth Evans – tried to overcome Australia’s outpost mentality at least to 
some degree by shifting the focus of their foreign policy away from its Western 
orientation towards Asia, thereby trying, in Evans’s words, to become “the odd man in” 
rather than “the odd man out” in Asia. This policy of “engagement,” however, was 
received rather controversially both within Australia as well as among its neighbors, and 
the Australian electorate rejected Keating’s vision of a more “Asian” Australia in the 1996 
election (Gorjão 2003: 187). Consequently, the Howard government soon re-adjusted 
foreign policy priorities, and immediately shifted priorities back towards the West in 
general and the United States in particular (Jones/Benvenuti 2006: 110), risking – and 
eventually losing – political capital in Asia. These incidents show that Australia is still 
struggling with her emotional relationship with her Asian neighbors, and that cultural 
gaps – to say the least – are still not fully resolved. In consequence, a rising Asian power 
with the potential to surpass the economic performance (and in the long run probably the 
military might as well) of Australia’s most intimate ally, the United States, naturally raises 
suspicion or even angst among Australians, especially if – at least from the Australian 
perspective – institutional ties in the region are weak and do not include Australia.  
3.2.2  Still the “odd man out”? Australia and the regional institutional structure 
The term commonly associated with Australia in political as well as academic debates is 
that of a “middle power” (Ungerer 2007). Most scholars use the term in an ambiguous 
way: The first meaning refers to Australia’s position in the international system in terms 
of capability and power, while the second meaning focuses on the typical behavior of a 
“middle power” which ”includes a preference for working through multilateral 
institutions and processes, a commitment to promoting international legal norms and a 
pro-active use of diplomatic, military and economic measures to achieve selected political 
outcomes” (Ungerer 2007: 539). The idea of Australia being such a middle power was 
most prominently emphasized by the Labor governments of Hawke and Keating, and 
especially by then foreign minister Gareth Evans. When Rudd came into power he took 
up this particular self-description as well. According to the proponents of this particular 
interpretation of the “middle power,” working with and the strengthening of the UN 
system, multilateralism and international law are in Australia’s self interest as only 
international order under UN scrutiny can guarantee the security of the fifth continent. 
The channels of the UN system and a broader range of international and regional 
organizations, so it is argued, offer Australia the chance of exerting influence which she 
could not otherwise achieve. And in fact, Australia has been quite influential in the UN 
context and “enjoys a tradition of highly successful input into the negotiations of 
multilateral arms control treaties” (Scott 1998: 559) and is often described as a “good 
international citizen” (Scott 1998: 559). There has been quite a debate on whether or not 
the idea of the typical behavior of a middle power as a “good international citizen” was 
the characteristic of a specific Labor foreign policy (Firth 2005: 50 et seq.) or whether the 
concept was in broader use. Carl Ungerer has shown that almost all post-WW II 
governments – with the possible exception of the Howard government after 9/11 – 
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followed, to different extents, this particular middle power approach. Ungerer concludes: 
“As a result, the middle power concept is perhaps the closest that Australia has ever come 
to articulating a self-conscious theory of foreign policy” (Ungerer 2007: 550). 
So much the worse that Australia is not as deeply integrated into the regional 
institutional architecture as Australia would like – many Asian states had reservations 
against Australia too – and that – at least from the Australian point of view – many Asian 
institutions are not as effective as Australia would wish them to be. Many experts agree 
that institutionalized security co-operation in Southeast Asia distinguishes itself through a 
complex “tangled web” of institutions (Tow 2008) and “that the current architecture isn’t 
working satisfactorily” (Murray 2010: 13). Many regimes and institutions, some more 
formal, others more informal, exist with overlapping responsibilities and competences but 
rather different designs and diverse memberships. The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) can be understood to be the most important institution in the region, 
“the core of regional cooperation” (Murray 2010: 14), with a wide range of issues 
addressed, but Australia “has never sought or been considered for membership in 
ASEAN” and “cannot be in ASEAN itself” (Firth 2005: 168). ASEAN’s core group consists 
of ten countries, with Indonesia being the biggest and most important. Despite the 
relatively small group of states, ASEAN seldom speaks with one voice (Chin 2009: 22). In 
1997/99 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was institutionalized, additionally including China, 
Japan and South Korea. APT has grown in importance in recent year, especially due to a 
more active Chinese stance (Zhang 2007: 6). 
Neither Australia nor the United States is a member in either ASEAN or APT but “only” 
“dialog partners,” together with the European Union, India, Russia and many more.  
China, Australia and the U.S., however, participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) with its special focus on security issues. But with a membership of 28 rather diverse 
participants (including the European Union as well as Mongolia or Canada), it is no 
wonder that the ARF is seen to be too large and has not proven its effectiveness yet 
(Woolcott 2009: 3). In addition, all three are members of APEC – an Australian initiative 
under PM Hawke – with its sole focus on economic issues. The most promising forum 
bringing together the most important players for the region’s future might be the East 
Asia Summit (EAS), sometimes called “ASEAN plus six” (additionally including India, 
Australia and New Zealand), covering a broad spectrum of issues with a membership of 
16 and invitations recently issued to the United States and Russia.  
All Asian institutions, however, share a common feature: their emphasis on informal 
rules, processes and regular patterns in contrast to more formal institutions with a 
binding set of regulations. In contrast to, for example, Europe, “[t]here’s no commitment 
to supranationalism or to institutionalism” in the “Asian region” (Murray 2010: 16). 
Given the widespread historical experiences of colonialism in Asia, there is widespread 
consensus that the integrity of the nation state and the right of self-determination are 
paramount principles “and states are generally unwilling to surrender some sovereignty to 
regional organizations in order to make them more effective” (Murray 2010: 16). Frank 
Frost seconds this: “[…] cooperation in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific has been 
characterized by caution, a strong emphasis on building dialogue […] and a reluctance to 
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try to develop binding sets of rules or any large supra-national structures of bureaucracies 
to pursue multilateral goals” (Frost 2009: 5).  
For Australia, especially for a Labor government with its middle power ambitions and 
preferences for rule-based institutions, this is a rather unsatisfactory situation. But 
Australian advances for deeper integration and more formal institutions have been 
blocked. Already in the early 1970s, when Gough Whitlam proposed establishing an Asia 
Pacific forum, “ASEAN killed the idea,” thereby establishing “a recurring tradition of 
ASEAN sword thrusts at Australian versions of regionalism” (Dobell 2011). The rise of 
China will make it even more problematic for Australia as, during recent years, China has 
switched from a bilateral approach to regional relations to a more multilateral approach, 
broadening its influence in regional institutions and even playing a leading role in the 
establishment of new institutions (Tow/Taylor 2009: 14; Zhang 2007: 5). The United 
States, on the other hand, has established a dense net of bilateral treaties and 
arrangements with some states (Australia, Singapore, Japan, and Taiwan) without gaining 
entry into Asian institutions yet. Since 2005, China has begun to describe her own vision 
of international and regional order as “harmonious,” but the “current motto of a 
‘harmonious world’ [...] also reflects thinly veiled dissatisfaction with the current unipolar 
world order.” (Zhang 2007: 3) and “there has been a growing conviction among Chinese 
scholars that China should exercise greater normative influences commensurate with its 
power status” (Zhang 2007: 3). China’s “harmony concept” is seen to be very similar to 
the established ASEAN approach based on consensus-building and respect for 
sovereignty, and has found broad acceptance among ASEAN states (Zhang 2007: 7). As is 
the case with many ASEAN states themselves, China is not too keen on using a broad 
definition of what should constitute “region” in the context of Asian institutions, and is 
pursuing a rather restrictive approach (Tow/Taylor 2009: 14), making it ever harder for 
Australia or the U.S. to achieve acceptance for their visions of institutionalized regional 
order. Many Australians fear that the Chinese initiative is having the effect of crowding 
the United States out of the region, and some conclude that America is increasingly being 
frustrated by the Chinese approach. In 2006, the Australian Senate’s Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee concluded that “the U.S.’ commitment to the 
region … appears to fall short in comparison to China” and continued “that Australia 
must do its utmost to encourage the United States to remain constructively engaged in the 
region” (Australian Senate 2006: xiii). But China’s institutional engagement is not the 
only reason why Australia fears that the United States may leave the region.  
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3.3  The strategic setting: “Strong and powerful friends” 
3.3.1  Two perspectives on the alliance with the United States  
Given its small population, Australia’s ability to levy troops is rather limited. The 
Australian Defence Forces today consist of roughly 58,000 permanent members (with 
roughly 30,000 in the Army, 14,600 in the Air Force and 13,600 in the Navy),18 a tiny 
fraction of what surrounding countries can mobilize. On the other hand, Australia has a 
defense budget of roughly A$25.66 billion (US$19.74 billion; 2008 budget, in 2008 prices), 
ranking Australia 13th in the world19 and being by far the highest in the immediate region. 
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) seeks to maintain technological superiority over the 
region’s other countries which, with the exception of Singapore, it has achieved. Australia 
sees technology as a necessary compensation for the country’s small population, but 
despite Australia’s high per capita income, absolute resources are limited by the size of 
her economy. The feeling of insecurity and fear combined with the knowledge of 
Australia’s limited (human) resources for national defense convinced Australia very early 
after independence that she would hardly be able to defend herself alone. To secure the 
help of – in the words of former PM Menzies – “great and powerful friends” has been one 
of the most important issues in Australian foreign policymaking, with Britain naturally 
being the first “powerful friend” Australia relied on. This reliance, however, ended on 15 
February 1942 with the fall of Singapore and the bombing of Darwin by Japanese air 
forces only four days later, and ultimately led to the end of British military presence in 
Asia. Left high and dry in the face of clear and present danger, Australia had to rely on the 
United States from then on. After the war, “having had its fears of Japanese – and, in a 
more general sense, Asian – aggression confirmed in the Second World War” (Hubbard 
2005: 10), Australia actively strove for a close and formal security cooperation with the 
U.S., leading to the ANZUS treaty between Australia, the U.S. and New Zealand signed in 
1951. ANZUS has been the center pillar of Australian security policy ever since, and no 
post-World War II government has seriously questioned the necessity of the alliance with 
the United States. It enjoys bipartisan support and “[e]xcept for the Vietnam War, the 
U.S.-Australia alliance received overwhelming support in opinion polls in Australia” 
(Dibb 2007b: 33).  
However, there have always been two schools of thought in Australian security 
thinking, which attach differing importance to the alliance and have a different view on 
what the main purpose of the alliance for Australia should be. It is interesting to note that 
these two perspectives loosely resemble the two positions held by the Liberal Coalition 
and the Labor party. The two schools are usually referred to as the “Forward Defence” 
School (FDS) or “Global Interest” School, (sometimes labeled the “global expeditionary 
 
 
18  www.defence.gov.au/Budget/09-10/dar/dar_0910_v1_s4.pdf#nameddest=a7 (4.12.2010).  
19 Australian defence budget surges to world's 13th largest, in: The Australian, September 4, 2008. 
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approach” (Davies 2009) or the “transformationalists” (Schreer 2008: 159)), on the one 
side, and the “Continentalist” or “Defence of Australia” School (DoA) on the other.  
The basic idea of the “forward defence” school rests on the assumption that Australia 
is under no circumstances able to defend herself without outside assistance. Adherents of 
the FDS argue that it is imperative to offer help and support to the stronger partner 
wherever possible, in order to create a moral obligation – an entitlement to a future quid 
pro quo – to help Australia in return in times of need. For the Australian Defence Forces a 
clear focus on a “forward defence” approach has, of course, important structural 
implications, as the major rationale of the concept rests on the Australian ability to 
project power and to be interoperable to fight side by side with major Allies, i.e. the 
United States. In a structural sense, “forward defence” emphasizes, first, the Army and the 
proverbial “boot on the ground” (Stephens 2007) with the necessary strategic and 
operational mobility, especially transport capabilities for rapid air deployment in theaters 
all over the world, and, second, niche capabilities such as special forces which are of high 
value to the stronger power. The FDS has been the preferred strategic orientation of 
almost all Liberal prime ministers.  
For proponents of the Defence of Australia School, on the other hand, Australia’s 
geography is the final arbiter when it comes to security and defense policy. In their 
opinion the central objective of the ADF should be the defense of the Australian 
continent, if necessary “without relying on the combat forces of our allies” (White 2007: 
164). Proponents of the DoA School acknowledge that the danger of a foreign attack on 
Australia has decreased tremendously since the end of the Cold War. But according to 
their perspective, prioritizing the defense of Australia is not a matter of probability but of 
potential consequence.  
The roots of the DoA School can be traced back to Richard Nixon’s “Guam Doctrine” 
of July 1969 and its implicit request “that America’s friends should be able to defend 
themselves against all but a major attack with their own combat forces” (Dibb 2007a: 12). 
Worried about the American commitment, “the need for the self-reliant ‘defence of 
Australia’ emerged as a serious proposition” (Dibb 2007a: 12) as the support of the 
Alliance seemed by no means guaranteed. Regarding the strategic consequences for 
Australia, the DoAS stresses – given Australia’s lack of strategic depth, with all major 
urban centers located at the coast – the need for air superiority and command of the 
surrounding waters – or at least capabilities to deny a potential adversary the northern 
approaches to Australia. Consequently, the approach privileges both navy and air force 
over the army. When it comes to the U.S. alliance, proponents of the DoA approach do 
not reject the alliance as such, but place an emphasis on the more indirect benefits. Given 
the dictum of former Labor defence minister Kim Beazley, Australia should strive for 
“self-reliance within alliance” (cited in Kelton 2008: 21). From this perspective, the 
alliance serves some very important purposes as the United States offers indispensable 
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intelligence, technology and defense equipment essential for the self-reliance proposed by 
the DoAS (Dibb 2007b: 35 et seq). Especially access to U.S. technology is seen as the sine 
qua non for the ADF’s high-tech posture (Schreer 2006).20 Defense of Australia is 
associated with the Australian Labor Party, or the left more generally. So, while both 
perspectives on Australian defense policy have a different stance when it comes to the 
direct relevance of the alliance and the United States as the main defender of Australia in 
times of crisis, they do share the notion that exceptional relations to the U.S. are 
paramount to Australian security. Both schools accept that a close alliance is thought to 
maintain America’s presence, influence and interest in the region, which Canberra 
understands to be vital for the region’s stability. Finally, being a close ally of the United 
States pays off not only militarily: “Australia’s closeness to America and its influence with 
Washington transforms Australia’s regional status: it allows Australia to punch above its 
weight in regional and, indeed, international security organizations” (Dibb 2007b: 33). 
With respect to China’s rise, both schools of thought fear the impact of an ever stronger 
China on Australia’s relations with the U.S. 
3.3.2 China’s rise and the implications for the alliance 
But what are the concrete implications of China’s rise on Australian security in general 
and the alliance with the United States in particular? Many Australian scholars fear that 
China’s rise will lead to China’s claiming a leadership role in the region, at least in 
Southeast Asia, and will result in a challenge to the U.S.’s presence in Asia. Since the 
1990s, the armed forces of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have undergone a 
tremendous, and continuing, modernization program (Blasko 2005; Bajoria 2009). 
Continued modernization of its armed forces has been a recurring theme in Beijing’s 
white paper “China's National Defense in 2008.”21 Especially when it comes to naval 
forces, China has abandoned its self-inflicted restriction to a “brown-water navy,” i.e. a 
navy basically focused on costal defense, and invested heavily in so-called “blue-water” 
capabilities (Willard 2010), i.e. warships capable of operating far from shore across the 
deep waters of open oceans. Especially the procurement of technologically advanced 
submarines with blue water capability is seen as a major threat to U.S. assets (O'Rourke 
2010: 43). In addition, according to Japan’s Asahi Shimbun, China has officially admitted 
for the first time to building an aircraft carrier, ready for launch by 2014 or 2015.22 
 
 
20  A high ranking military expert, however, qualified the U.S.-Australian technology transfer, arguing that 
despite the close links, Australia does not have access to the latest American technology: “From an 
expert’s perspective, it’s always disappointing.” Personal interview with anonymous, November 1, 2006, 
Canberra.   
21  www.china.org.cn/government/central_government/2009-01/20/content_17155577.htm (12.12.2010).  
22  www.asahi.com/english/TKY201012160435.html (19.12.2010). 
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But China is not only modernizing its navy but its air force as well. Naval aviators are 
reported to conduct long-range exercises (Denmark 2010), and only recently pictures 
were posted on the Internet showing what experts assume to be the first Chinese fighter 
with stealth capabilities (Axe 2010). What the U.S. military is definitely concerned about 
is a Chinese anti- ship ballistic missile system, supposed to be capable of penetrating the 
air defense of American carrier groups far from the Chinese coastline, posing a serious 
threat to America’s ability to project power: “ASBMs are considered to be one of the main 
pillars of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that China has been developing to 
counter and/or neutralize America's vast power projection capabilities.” (Kato 2010).23 
The strategic approach underpinning China’s programs seem clear:  “China's strategy is 
apparently centered on preventing U.S. carrier strike groups from intervening in the event 
of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait” (Kato 2010), a classical “sea denial strategy.” This means 
that China does not have to match American power on a costly one-to-one basis, but 
rather to invest in technologies which more and more restrict the U.S. Navy’s freedom of 
action in Asian waters, or at least complicate maneuvers tremendously (White 2010: 29). 
Experts agree, for example, that the sheer possibility of one hostile submarine in the vicinity 
of a carrier group has a tremendous cautionary effect. Finally, many observers are 
impressed by China’s ability to conduct networked operations, close to par with U.S. 
abilities (Denmark 2010), while the U.S. military is eager to play it down (Ackerman 2011). 
With its rising power, China is behaving more and more self-confidently in the region, 
and many states are increasingly concerned about what the Indonesian analyst Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar has described as “increasingly aggressive rhetoric from Beijing” (quoted 
in Callick 2010b). 
Military experts therefore predict that the most likely scenario for a military 
confrontation between the rising contender and the status quo power is a serious clash in 
the East or South China Sea. Already in 2001 a U.S. spy plane was intercepted by Chinese 
fighters. After a midair collision the plane was forced to make an emergency landing on 
the Chinese island of Hainan, where its crew was detained and interrogated and finally 
released after a letter of apology by the U.S. Ambassador to China, Joseph Prueher.24  In 
2009 the Pentagon reported that Chinese vessels had “shadowed and aggressively 
maneuvered in dangerously close proximity” to a U.S. surveillance ship, said to have been 
operating in international waters.25 While it is hard to know who is to blame for these 
instances, they show that the possibility of a serious clash is not to be underestimated. 
From the Australian perspective, especially from the perspective of the proponents of the 
“forward defense” posture, the rise of China’s military and its effects on the United States 
might have serious implications: In the case of a clash, Australia might end up in a major 
 
 
23  There are, however, doubts whether the system has yet passed a live-fire test. See (Ackerman 2011). 
24  http://articles.cnn.com/2001-04-11/world/prueher.letter.text_1_emergency-landing-international-
emergency-procedures-chinese-pilot?_s=PM:asiapcf (12.12.2010). 
25  www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e04ecda8-0d13-11de-a555-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz19yr4GEsD (12.12.2010).  
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military conflict on America’s side against one of the most powerful nations. Already in 
April 2001 Australia got an idea what support of the United States means in Beijing’s eyes: 
Three ships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) were “challenged” by a PLA Navy vessel 
as they sailed though the Taiwan strait “[i]n what appears to be a retaliatory move” (Lyon 
2001: 525 et seq) for Australia’s diplomatic support to the U.S. in the spy plane incident 
only weeks before. Interestingly enough, in 2004 then Liberal Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer surprised both China as well as the United States with a statement that Australia 
would not feel obliged under the ANZUS treaty to assist the United States in the military 
defense of Taiwan should this situation occur.26 While experts agreed that Downer was 
technically correct in regard to the wording of the ANZUS treaty, “[t]he inevitable US 
reaction was swift and resolute and Downer was forced to make an embarrassing back 
down” when PM John Howard “quickly reassured the US of Australia’s loyalty to the 
alliance” (Conley 2005: 265) . 
America, however, might react to the rising Chinese pressure in a totally different way, 
namely by withdrawing major contingents from the region. Without American military 
presence, Australia might face rougher times in the future, and all observers – even 
proponents of the DoA School – agree that Australia “should not have the expectation of 
being able to unilaterally defend Australia against a major power” (Davies 2008: 21). But 
the negative effects of a reduced American presence, or even a full withdrawal, might not 
primarily be direct, but are more likely to be indirect. Many Australian scholars argue that 
the current stability of Southeast Asia, the almost complete lack of military conflict or 
confrontation, is owed to the American presence and Washington’s ability to project 
more power into the region than most countries can muster, just by sending a couple of 
carrier battle groups. Given the high potential for conflict, especially in the resource-rich 
South Chinese Sea, Australia fears that an American retreat could lead to a flaring up of 
suppressed conflicts between Asian states.  
At the moment, however, the shadow of U.S. power alone is enough to affect political 
and military outcomes. When, for example, Australia decided to intervene in East Timor 
in 1999, some observers feared a clash between the Royal Australian Navy and the 
Indonesian Navy when Indonesian submarines closely shadowed Australian vessels 
approaching Timor.27 But despite the lack of actual U.S. forces, America supported the 
mission with logistics and intelligence, and threatened financial sanctions should Jakarta 
not cooperate (Albinski 2000: 206). It is this kind of backing that enables Australia to 
“punch above its weight” (Thomson 2005) and act more self-confidently in the region 
than their sheer capabilities alone would normally allow. So, any change in the power 
balance between the U.S. and China which restricts the U.S.’s freedom to maneuver 
naturally weakens Australia’s regional influence and reawakens the fear of yet another 
powerful friend deserting Australia.  
 
 
26  www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/08/17/1092508475187.html (12.12.2010).  
27  Personal interview with Australian security expert, Canberra, November 1, 2006.  
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In sum, the rise of China presents Australia with important opportunities and 
advantages (especially in the economic realm) but daunting challenges as well. Seen from 
Canberra, it has the potential to marginalize Australia’s influence in the region, might 
lead to at least indirect security concerns, and revives old fears and prejudices against 
potential Asian expansionism. Finding a coherent way of dealing with a rising China 
therefore seems to be a high priority objective for any Australian government.  
4.  Kevin Rudd’s approach: Pushing for the best while preparing 
for the worst? 
When Kevin Rudd won the national election on November 24, 2007 many observers 
expected a profound improvement in Australia’s relations with Asia in general and China 
in particular. After the predominantly bumpy years under Howard, expectations were 
high that Rudd would renew the old Labor tradition of Hawke and Keating of 
engagement with Asia. Holding a First Class Honors BA in Asian Studies, having served 
as First Secretary in the Australian embassy in Beijing in the 1980s, and being capable of 
speaking fluent Mandarin, Rudd seemed especially qualified to improve relations with 
China. On February 20 2008, the Prime Minister made it clear in an interview with ABC 
Radio Canberra that he understood improving relations with China as a matter of 
national (economic) interest as well as a personal priority: 
“The important thing is, to take our current relationship with China to a new level. I believe 
that the economic opportunities between us are significant. There is enormous resource in 
energy relationship between our two countries and we need to have a strategic discussion 
about that, long term – China’s interest, our national interests. […] And in terms of our 
political relationship with the Chinese government, I look forward to catching up with 
some old friends and talking about the future.”28 
In his speech to the Returned & Services League of Australia at the RSL National 
Congress on September 9, 2008, Rudd gave a more detailed outline of his personal 
security and defense vision for the 21st century, the “century of the Asian Pacific,” “[b]y 
2030, […] possibly even by 2020 […] home to the largest and most dynamic economies in 
the world” (Rudd 2008b).  
As one, if not the most important factor driving change in the region, Rudd identified 
the “rise of China” and “China’s economic growth,” influencing both China’s perception 
of its own role in the world as well as the way others see China, leading inevitably to more 
Chinese influence in the region (Rudd 2008b). In addition to the rise of China, Rudd 
argued, demographic changes (aka population growth) in almost all Asian-Pacific 
countries were about to change the face of the region tremendously. As a consequence, 
 
 
28  http://pmrudd.archive.dpmc.gov.au/node/5942; Last access November 8, 2010. 
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Rudd foreshadowed great “population, food, water and energy resource pressure,” and 
concluded that, in addition to the economic and political contest taking place, the Asia-
Pacific would become a “much more contested region” militarily. 
For Australia’s most important ally, the United States, Rudd expected a relative decline 
vis-à-vis other economies (especially China and India). But he did not question the 
“ability of the US to maintain its global leadership role” at least “through to the mid-
century” as the world’s only superpower. He confirmed the extraordinary role of the 
alliance with the United States as the “bedrock of [Australian] strategic policy” (Rudd 
2008b) and even promised to improve operational cooperation., However, the speech left 
the most important question from a strategic point of view unaddressed, namely whether 
the U.S. was willing to maintain her strong Pacific presence in the face of a rising and 
expanding China. 
In the following months Rudd again stressed the fact that Australia had to prepare for 
the changes taking place in the region, and made it clear that these preparations included 
military modernization, with a particular focus on air combat capabilities and naval forces, 
particularly the size and capabilities of the Australian submarine fleet. Rudd’s “realistic” 
tone caught many observers by surprise. In the conservative Australian, the even more 
conservative and very pro-American Greg Sheridan concluded after Rudd’s first year in 
office that “Kevin Rudd has been misjudged on his approach to Asia, especially China” 
(Sheridan 2008). Many of the ideas Rudd had sketched out in the RSL address were taken 
up in a speech he gave to Parliament roughly three month later on December 4, 2008, which 
was to be the first National Security Statement to Parliament by an Australian Prime 
Minister ever. In this historic speech Rudd confirmed his perspective on the dawn of an 
Asian-Pacific century, with its prospects of economic opportunities as well as looming 
potential for security concerns. Rudd left no doubt that he ultimately attributed the relative 
stability and peace which the region had enjoyed for the last decades to the presence of the 
United States and her power projection ability within the region (Rudd 2008a). 
So, in many respects, the new Labor Prime Minister shared what many scholars of 
Australian foreign and security policy claim: that Australia faces a serious dilemma in its 
behavior towards China. While the economic rise of China is clearly in Australia’s 
interest, the risk involved in the associated rise of its military capabilities and seemingly 
more self-confident behavior in the region is seen to be too severe to be left unaddressed. 
Rudd then initiated what might be called a “double-track” policy towards China, which, at 
first sight, seemed to be contradictory and even led to the accusation that the left hand, 
defense, appeared not to know what the government’s right hand was doing 
(Leaver/Kelton 2010: 264). 
However, it will be shown that the seemingly contradictory policies can best be 
understood from the perspective of Power Transition Theory described above, and are 
complementary rather than contradictory. While the policy towards China under Rudd 
had of course additional elements, the next two sections will focus on the two elements 
which are the most prominent and differ the most sharply: Kevin Rudd’s proposal for an 
Asian Pacific Community on the one hand, and the Defence White Paper of 2009 on the 
other.  
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4.1  Carrots: Rudd’s APC proposal 
In June 2008 in an address at the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre in Sydney, then Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd surprised not only his audience with a speech which was 
programmatically called “It’s time to build an Asian Pacific Community” (Rudd 2008d). 
Citing the major regional changes and challenges in the near future such as economic 
growth, changing demographics, energy, food and water consumption, Rudd argued for 
“strong and effective regional institutions” to “underpin an open, peaceful, stable, 
prosperous and sustainable region.” Obviously Rudd felt that the current institutions 
described above were not sufficient as a basis for building a stable regional security 
architecture. While respecting existing institutions and fora like Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three or the East 
Asian Summit (EAS), Rudd advocated an Asian Pacific Community (APC) with a broad 
membership, a “regional institution which spans the entire Asia-Pacific region – 
including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states in the 
region.”  
Rudd argued that “[a]t present none of our existing regional mechanisms as currently 
configured are capable” of developing “a genuine and comprehensive sense of community 
whose habitual operating principle is cooperation.” Therefore, his Asia Pacific 
Community (APC) was supposed to become a “regional institution which is able to 
engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political 
matters and future challenges related to security” (Rudd 2008d). In proposing the APC, 
Rudd envisaged Australia making an active contribution to a “peaceful, prosperous and 
sustainable” Asia-Pacific century.  
To promote his proposal and set off a debate about the idea, Rudd sent a special envoy, 
Richard Woolcott, to almost all relevant capitals in the region to collect thoughts and 
ideas for improvement, to be published in a special report. Obviously Rudd was aware 
that if history were any guide, his proposal would be sailing against a headwind. And 
reactions to the APC proposal were lukewarm and cautious indeed, to say the least, with 
only some support. Many governments were taken by surprise and taken short. The need 
for APC was not seen – especially as Rudd’s proposal lacked information about the 
concrete institutional design he had in mind.29 Despite Rudd’s positive remarks on 
ASEAN institutions, the critical subtext that ASEAN – in whatever forum – was unable to 
solve potential problems at least ten years in the future rankled with core ASEAN 
members in particular (Frost 2009: 12), with western-friendly Singapore being “the main 
opponent of the idea” (Carr/Roberts 2010: 249). A friendlier version of this criticism 
stated that there was no need to “reinvent [...] key institutions” (Soesastro 2009: 4).  
 
 
29  In later speeches, Rudd argued that he had deliberately avoided any suggestions for institutional design to 
ensure an open process (Rudd 2009).  
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There was reluctance for yet another meeting at head of government (HOG) level, and 
both the scope of membership (except for the countries explicitly named) as well as the 
decision- making rules seemed unresolved (Qingguo 2009: 7). Especially Rudd’s references 
to the European Union30 caused fear of too formal and rule-bound an integration, and a 
specific institutional design. In later speeches Rudd tried to accommodate some of the 
criticism by clarifying his proposal: “Furthermore, let us be clear about what an Asia Pacific 
Community is not. It is not an economic union. It is not a monetary union. It is not at this 
stage a customs union. And it is certainly not a political union. All of our existing regional 
mechanisms have a critical role to play both now and into the future – including ASEAN, 
APEC and the EAS.” (Rudd 2008c). But still he stressed that “[m]anaging major power 
relations, particularly in the context of the rise of China and India will be crucial to our 
collective future” and that there was “no single regional institution with a pan-regional 
mandate that covers the full policy spectrum” (Rudd 2009).  
In contrast to its relatively cold reception at the international level, Rudd’s proposal 
received more affirmation in Australia (Carr/Roberts 2010: 248) – at least in principle. 
Commentators agreed that the way the proposal had been prepared and presented had 
been “marred by failures” (White 2009b), i.e. the fact that special envoy Woolcott was 
informed about his new task only hours before Rudd’s official announcement, and that 
there had been no consultation with other Asian leaders before its publication. But most 
also agreed that there was a need for institutions better suited to accommodating the 
fundamental changes in the region resulting from the rise of China and probably from the 
rise of India as well. Carr and Roberts argue that “the ability to manage political and 
economic challenges in the evolving U.S.-China relationship was a key motive behind the 
[APC] proposal” (Carr/Roberts 2010: 249) and many commentators judged the proposal 
against the background of this alleged aim. While one can only speculate about individual 
motives, it is reasonable to assume that Rudd indeed foresaw the problems and risks of 
further unimpeded Chinese engagement in regional institutions and the potential 
challenge for Australia of a “future China-dominated regional order [...] based on 
different norms and values from those currently espoused by Western countries, 
including Australia” (Zhang 2007: 9). In addition, at least when Rudd presented his 
proposal in 2008, there was no regional institution to bring together China and the US 
eye-to-eye to address cross-border issues. Given the potential for military clashes between 
the PLA and the U.S. Navy, Rudd wanted an institution to bring both heavyweights 
together in a more formalized context.  
 
 
30  As a matter of fact Rudd had said that the “European Union of course does not represent an identikit 
model of what we would seek to develop in the Asia Pacific.” However, he added: “But what we can learn 
from Europe is this – it is necessary to take the first step. In the 1950s, sceptics saw European integration 
as unrealistic. But most people would now agree that the goal of the visionaries in Europe who sat down 
in the 1950s and resolved to build prosperity and a common sense of a security community has been 
achieved. It is that spirit we need to capture in our hemisphere” (Rudd 2008d).  
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Consequently, the relevant question to ask was whether the Rudd proposal was not the 
wrong tool for the right task (White 2009b). In contrast to Rudd, Hugh White was and 
still is skeptical about an institutional solution with a wide membership and “the idea that 
Asia’s new order can and should be negotiated between all the powers of the region – big, 
middle and small” (White 2009b). He instead proposed “a kind of concert among Asia’s 
great powers” (White 2009b), an informal institution where the strongest powers agree on 
shared leadership and certain principles of behavior, an idea he has developed further in 
his latest Quarterly Essay cited in the introduction (White 2010), which has stirred a 
rather lively debate among foreign policy experts, vigorously waged on the Lowy 
Institute’s Interpreter blog.31 White’s institutional design – and his criticism of the APC 
proposal – is consistent with the typical realist understanding (in terms of IR theory) of 
international institutions, as they are regarded as relevant only when they reflect the 
power distribution among their members (Grieco 1990). Given, however, the rather 
vague and sketchy picture of the APC proposal and given the fact that Rudd always 
mentioned some countries by name (United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia), and 
not the others, he made clear that he understood that there were differences in weight and 
importance of the potential members, and that some political animals might be more 
equal than others – with corresponding influence on the informal handling of the formal 
institutional design. From the perspective of Power Transition Theory, Rudd’s idea can be 
understood as an attempt by a self-proclaimed middle power to bring important, and 
potentially dissatisfied states like China – but probably Indonesia as well – into a 
potentially more formal and rule-based institution with a cross-cutting agenda, hoping 
for corresponding socializing effects. A rule-based international system where states 
comply with institutional arrangements is seen to serve Australia’s national interest best. 
At the same time, the APC would keep the United States engaged in an institution central 
to the region and thereby within the region, mitigating tension between the rising 
contender China and the still dominant US. All in all, the attempt is consistent with 
Australia’s national identity as a law-abiding “good international citizen,” best 
represented by the Labor party. So, the APC can be seen as a somewhat clumsy, ill 
prepared and rather ambitious but still purposeful tool to socialize rising powers into a 
more rule-based style of institutional cooperation. 
However, when a big conference hosted by Australia in Sydney in December 2009 to 
promote the APC finally failed to convince skeptics of the idea (White 2009a), it was clear 
that Rudd had, despite his tremendous efforts, failed to step into the shoes of Bob Hawke, 
who had initiated the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in the early 1980s. In June 
2010, The Australian finally reported that Rudd would “not now regain the initiative in 
devising a new regional infrastructure,” and that he conceded that “the development of 
the regional architecture must be left in the hands of ASEAN” (Callick 2010a). Obviously 
Rudd now understood that he had grossly misjudged Asian leaders’ willingness to 
 
 
31  www.lowyinterpreter.org/?d=D%20-%20Hugh%20White%27s%20Quarterly%20Essay (11.11.2010).  
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downgrade their ASEAN institutions and abandon their particular style of handling issues 
for a new and more formal institution, with the main purpose of containing both China 
and the U.S. 
But according to some sources, the effort was not completely in vain, as the invitation 
to the United States and Russia to join the EAS was a reaction to Rudd’s APC proposal 
(Carr/Roberts 2010: 205). So, even if the EAS is unlikely to be the kind of institution Rudd 
had in mind when he made his APC proposal, he achieved at least one important aim of 
his idea: he brought China and the United States into one important regional institution.32  
4.2  Sticks: The 2009 Defence White Paper 
But the APC proposal was not the only policy of the Rudd government with direct or 
indirect implications for the Australia-China relationship which surprised political 
observers. Almost a year after the APC proposal, in May 2009, the Australian Department 
of Defence released its long-awaited latest Defence White Book, the first comprehensive 
White Paper after 2000. Observers were not surprised by the overall direction the new 
White Book took. The general direction of impact was consistent with what could be 
expected from a Labor government: in contrast to Howard’s 2003 and 2005 White Paper 
Updates, which were written under the impression of 9/11 and had a clear focus on global 
commitment and “forward defence” (Schreer 2006), Labor’s 2009 White Paper stressed 
once again the defense of Australia: In the tradition of the “concentric circles” idea, first 
developed in the 1986 Dibb Report, the White Paper formulated a priority list of tasks for 
the Australian Defence Forces, with deterrence and defeat of armed attacks on Australia 
being the single most important. In second position followed contributions “to stability 
and security in the South Pacific and East Timor,” in third place contributions “to 
military contingencies in the Asia-Pacific region” and finally preparation “to contribute to 
military contingencies in the rest of the world” (Department of Defence 2009: 13).  
When it came to the alliance with the United States, the White Paper gave a clear 
commitment, but at the same time cautioned that “a defence policy founded on an 
implicit bargain that others would come to our aid with combat forces if we were 
threatened or attacked is simply too uncertain a basis for providing security and 
irresponsible abrogation of Australia’s strategic sovereignty” (Department of Defence 
2009: 47). Being in line with the DoA perspective on the Alliance described above, the 
alliance was seen as an important partnership in regard to “associated capability, 
intelligence and technology” (Department of Defence 2009: 50) and probably to political 
weight but not to direct defense.  
 
 
32  It is an ironic turn of events that the EAS might become the replacement for Rudd’s APC, as it was the 
Howard government’s efforts which earned Australia’s membership in it.    
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What was surprising, for some even disturbing, however, was the fact that the 
government explicitly named the rise of China as the most important security issue 
determining the shape of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) for at least the next two 
decades. As Leaver and Kelton point out “[o]ne of the benefits of the earlier ‘Defence of 
Australia doctrine’ was that it avoided naming strategic threats by focusing upon the 
technological challenge that Canberra needs to meet” (Leaver/Kelton 2010: 263). To be 
sure, China had been mentioned in many strategic analyses since the early 1950s, but 
usually not singled out and definitely not pilloried (Smith 2009). In a rather straight-
forward tone, the White Papers expressed concerns about China’s military modernization 
program, described above. It stated:  
“A major power of China’s stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military 
capability befitting its size. But the pace, scope and structure of China’s military 
modernisation have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not carefully 
explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its 
military plans. China has begun to do this in recent years, but needs to do more. If it does 
not, there is likely to be a question in the minds of regional states about the long-term 
strategic purpose of its force development plans, particularly as the modernisation appears 
potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan” 
(Department of Defence 2009: 34).  
In the diplomatic realm, these statements might be understood as sailing close to the 
wind. Elsewhere the White Paper continued speculating, this time, however, without 
naming China, about a “remote but plausible potential of confrontation with a major 
power adversary” (Department of Defence 2009: 64). And the White Paper cautioned that 
“[g]rowing economic interdependence will not preclude inter-state conflicts or tension 
short of war,” a clear indication that the economic ramifications for the region of China’s 
rise were not seen as a guarantee for a peaceful future on their own (Department of 
Defence 2009: 22).  
On a more general level, the whole paper indicated a policy reorientation towards a 
realist perspective, focusing on nation states, thereby rejecting the priorities of the 
Howard government – non-state actors, terrorism, WMD proliferation and state failure. 
Consequently, at first glance the new White Book seems not only an unnecessary and 
inept diplomatic affront to the Chinese, but seems to promote an outdated state-centered 
security concept, some scholars would not deem applicable to the post-Cold War era 
(Lyon/Davies 2009: 2).  
In respect of force planning, the White Paper called for significant armament 
programs, especially for the Australian Navy and Air Force, another indication of a more 
DoA-leaning orientation, with conventional security threats in mind. The single most 
important item was that the White Paper called for the procurement of twelve new 
conventional submarines to replace the six trouble-ridden Collins-class subs around 2030, 
which would be, when implemented, the most expensive armament project in Australian 
military history. In direct comparison, planned investment in surface vessels was modest, 
but the White Paper called for more capable future frigates, especially optimized for anti-
submarine warfare (Department of Defence 2009: 64).  
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Another major project the White Paper called for was the procurement of the 
American F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), a state-of-the-art fifth generation fighter jet. 
Already, under Howard, Australia had decided to join the American-led consortium and 
announced its intention to procure a batch of roughly 100 fighters. The Rudd government 
confirmed this decision.33 In contrast to the White Paper Updates of 2003 and 2005, the 
Army with its “offshore interests” (Bostock 2006) was on the losing side, something many 
commentators from the “forward defence” school objected to.34 A final surprise was that 
the White Paper called for the acquisition of maritime-based land-attack cruise missiles 
(LACM), to be placed both on surface vessels as well as on the future submarine to 
provide the government with the option “to conduct long-range precision strike 
operations against hardened, defended and difficult to access targets” (Department of 
Defence 2009: 81).  
But what was the rationale behind this important shift in priorities away from an 
expeditionary army, and the proposed heavy investment in submarines and long-distance 
strike capabilities? 
As mentioned above, U-boats – and especially silent conventional ones - are usually 
used for sea denial rather than sea dominance. The uncertainty about the possibility of 
submarines being in a specific sector tremendously increases the time and effort surface 
vessels have to invest in safe travel, and it is almost impossible to be absolutely certain that 
no hostile sub is in the immediate vicinity. Consequently, submarines are understood to 
have a strong deterrent effect on an enemy whose only way of approach is by sea, and 
raise the expected costs of an invasion. Therefore, they are the most economical way of 
defending a continent like Australia against a major attack, and they signal resolve against 
a potential aggressor. One might conclude from this train of thought that the White Paper 
anticipated a U.S. withdrawal from the region and was preparing for a self-reliant defense 
of Australia. Investing in submarines has, however, an additional rationale: In the early 
1960s the United States stopped building diesel-electric submarines, and decommissioned 
most of its conventional attack submarines before 1990. Since then the U.S. Navy has 
relied on nuclear submarines only. While nuclear-powered submarines have many 
advantages, the most important being their ability to stay submerged for days, weeks or 
even months, they suffer from a fundamental problem: the cooling system of the reactor 
cannot be switched off, making the boat noisier than a conventional submarine which can 
switch off all internal systems.35 In addition, with latest fuel-cell technology, modern 
conventional submarines can stay submerged for at least several days, up to two weeks, 
 
 
33  At the moment it is not clear whether Australia can procure the 100 JSF. As other partners in the 
consortium have decided to procure fewer planes than originally envisaged, unit costs are very likely to 
increase, making the procurement more expensive for Australia. If Australia, however, reduces her order, 
unit costs might increase again, making other states buy fewer JSF and so on.    
34  www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/05/21/2577494.htm (10.11.2010). 
35  www.fas.org/spp/eprint/snf03221.htm (17.8.2010).  
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making them silent but lethal weapons against surface vessels in times of crisis, perfect for 
sea denial. From the Australian point of view, a noteworthy conventional submarine force 
can be seen as a valuable niche contribution to the United States’s capabilities in the 
region, the Seventh Fleet. Conventional submarines therefore not only constitute a 
valuable factor after a potential American withdrawal, but would not only support U.S. 
operations in the Southwest and Central Pacific but would also provide important input 
to the security of the U.S. fleet, reducing the likelihood of U.S. withdrawal.36  
So, the future force structure described in the White Paper is optimized for two 
contingencies: a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region or a potential stand-off 
between U.S. forces and another major power. Despite its obvious DoA focus, the force 
structure announced gave Australia enough capabilities to keep Alliance operations a 
serious possibility.  
Reactions to the White Paper were as to be expected. Already before the official 
publication, “senior Chinese diplomats and scholars” were annoyed about the “apparent 
hawkish stance” of PM Rudd (Garnaut 2009). More modest Chinese commentators argued 
that Australia was following “the US ‘example’ of securitization” (Zhang 2009) while others 
“slammed Australia's new defence white paper as a ‘crazy’, ‘stupid’ and ‘dangerous’ 
document that risks inciting an arms race across the region” (Garnaut et al. 2009).  
So, with its blunt language and its call for a significant arms build-up, the White Paper 
was sending a clear signal: Despite her limited resources and fully aware of the relatively 
small impact her forces would have in any confrontation with a major adversary, 
Australia wanted to be prepared for the worst case - military conflict in the region. From 
the perspective of Power Transition Theory this seemed a rather prudent approach, as the 
theory assumes a low likelihood of peaceful transformation. Preparing for the worst case 
(defense of Australia while simultaneously filling an American capability gap in order to 
keep the U.S. in the region) was a well orchestrated move. However, as in the APC case, 
the political “spin,” in this case the explicit naming of China in the White Paper, was far 
from perfect to say the least. 
 
 
36  I owe the final thought to my colleague Peter Kreuzer.   
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5.  Conclusion 
In early December 2010, the British newspaper The Guardian released U.S. embassy 
cables received from the Internet platform Wikileaks with some alleged statements by 
then Prime Minister Rudd to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton from March 2009. 
According to the cables, Rudd called himself “a brutal realist on China” and  
“argued for ‘multilateral engagement with bilateral vigor’ – integrating China effectively 
into the international community and allowing it to demonstrate greater responsibility, all 
while also preparing to deploy force if everything goes wrong. Rudd said the Australian 
intelligence community keeps a close watch on China's military modernization, and 
indicated the forthcoming Australian Defence White Paper's focus on naval capability is a 
response to China's growing ability to project force.”  
And the Cable continued: 
“Rudd explained the thinking behind his Asia Pacific community (APC) initiative mostly as 
an effort to ensure Chinese dominance of the East Asia Summit (EAS) did not result in a 
‘Chinese Monroe Doctrine’ and an Asia without the United States.”37 
This short paragraph nicely summarized the results derived from the analysis of this 
report. Almost from the very beginning, Kevin Rudd’s government pursued a double-
track policy against China, knowing full well that Australia had very much to gain 
economically from the rise of China but much to lose from a dissatisfied China which 
clashed with the United States militarily. On the one hand Rudd advanced his APC 
proposal to integrate both China as well as the United States into a more formal 
multilateral institutional setting in the region, to give China more responsibility and bring 
her eye-to-eye with the United States in a regional context while raising U.S. interest in 
the region. In regard to China, the obvious aim was to socialize China into a rule-based 
regional system, trying to take the edge off China’s dissatisfaction by allocating 
responsibility.  
As Hugh White has repeatedly argued, the APC might not have been the institution 
best suited for this purpose, especially as other states from the region did not play along 
and were unwilling to sacrifice their conception of regional cooperation for smoothing 
U.S. – Chinese relations in the region. Seen as realpolitik,” lobbying in Washington for a 
“concert,” where a number of strong states agree “that none will try to dominate, and 
instead all share power more or less equally” (White 2010: 23) might indeed be the better 
strategy, probably with much better prospect of success.  
For Kevin Rudd, however, promoting a “concert” was probably not a viable 
alternative. First,  a concert of powers, by its very nature, aims at transforming the 
international system in a way which the powerful members see fit to do, and brings a kind 
of arbitrariness into the international order, which runs counter to the reliability of an 
 
 
37  www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/199393 (7.1.2011). 
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accepted rule- and law-based system. From the perspective of PTT, the rising state has to 
be socialized into the existing normative order. This does not, of course, prevent making 
allowances to better suit the needs of the rising state, but is definitely different from the 
back-room power politics of a “concert” in the realist sense.  
Second, Rudd’s APC proposal did not contradict what can be understood as the 
Australian national identity described above. While national identities usually are not 
prescriptive in the sense that they stipulate a certain policy, they define the scope of 
permissible action. As the strong reaction to Hugh White’s proposal shows, a concert 
which might lead to concessions on issues which the Australian public deems to be 
essential, e.g. human rights, will face much more public resistance than an approach 
which is consistent with the basics of the Australian identity.38 
On the other hand the Defence White Paper described a hedging strategy for the 
potential scenarios that a dissatisfied China might either clash with the United States or 
oust the U.S. from the region. Rudd felt that in the case of a military clash, there is hardly 
any way for Australia to remain on the sidelines as either the United States or China 
would press for Australia to show her colors. Investing in submarines, long-range cruise 
missiles and cutting-edge aircraft can be understood as the best preparation for both 
possibilities, and again as a way to keep the U.S. in the region. From a theoretical 
perspective, finally, Rudd’s approach of institutional carrots and military sticks (or rather 
twigs?) seemed custom-made for Australia. First, it was in line with recommendations 
derived from Power Transition Theory, balancing integration and military hedging. 
Second, it was consistent with both Australia’s history as well as her national identity, and 
therefore had a realistic chance of public support: Both the APC as well as the Defence 
White Paper were influenced by Australia’s self-image as a law-abiding “middle power.” 
In sum, what at first glance seem to be incongruous or even contradictory elements make 
up a whole when examined through the lens of Power Transition Theory. 
 
 
38  In a way Hugh White is aware of this when he concedes that “[b]ecause China’s values are different from 
ours, we tend to see any compromise […] as a sacrifice of our values on the altar of expediency” but 
continues that “we cannot learn to live with a powerful China if we regard every accommodation as a 
betrayal of principle” (White 2010: 54).    
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